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Historical Ecology is one of the ascendant 
views in ecological and environmental 
anthropology.  It originates in the intellectual 
transformation of history and ecology during the 
last 50 years, and seeped into anthropology in the 
last 10 to 15 years.  Historical Ecology is 
increasingly recognized as one of the key 
approaches in the discipline helping to advance 
our understanding of what it means to be human. 
There are numerous definitions of historical 
ecology, but the anthropological challenge is to 
place human decision-making, and the 
consciousness that drives it, at the center of our 
analyses of the human-environmental relationship 
(Crumley 1994, Whitehead 1998, Whitney 1994).  
What this challenge entails is clear from a 
caricature of how the natural and social sciences 
view this relationship.  In the natural sciences, 
humans are drivers of environmental change and 
there is little or no insight into the rationality 
behind any given transformation.  In the social 
sciences, cognition and the resulting choices made 
by humans link them to their environment in a 
dialectical process of transformation.  Humans as 
drivers of environmental change are nothing more 
than a problem to be disposed of; humans as co-
producers with environment of the transformation 
offer the potential for altering the final outcome. 
As is so often the case with emerging 
approaches there is debate as to whether historical 
ecology is a unified theoretical position or merely 
a research tool (Balée 1998, Whitehead 1998).  
However, it can be productive to consider a 
different question emerging from our 
responsibility to manage Earth (Vitousek, 
Mooney, and Lubchenco 1997): How can 
anthropology participate in the collaborations 
needed to understand the neglected-to-engineered 
gradient of current environmental systems?  
Toward answering this question I first review the 
points of origin for historical ecology then 
examine how the essential properties of time can 
help center the practice of historical ecology on a 
problem and a place.  The objective is to move 
historical ecology closer to addressing how past 
ecologies produce present ones in order to 
consider the future(s) we might pursue rather than 
simply let happen. 
 
POINTS OF ORIGIN 
All disciplines are continuously remodeled as 
practitioners push outward the boundaries of 
knowledge and improve their methods of inquiry.  
History by comparison to ecology is an old 
discipline, but historical ecology emerges from 
the relatively recent transformation of “old” 
history into “new” history and “reductionistic” 
ecology into “integrative” ecology.  The 
revolution in the sense of Kuhn (1996) begins 
shortly after World War II and is completed by 
approximately 1980.  In essence, history as a 
discipline came to recognize the importance of 
environment, and ecology as a discipline came to 
recognize the importance of history.  Historical 
ecology as the convergence of new history and 
integrative ecology is increasingly practiced 
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across a diverse set of fields from zoology through 
anthropology. 
 
New History 
Not more than 100 years ago, the established 
historical paradigm was to create narratives about 
the organization of power and authority from 
documentary sources and present them as 
testimony.  As described by Fischer (1989: viii), 
“’I have steeped myself in the sources, and here is 
what I believe to have happened,” and they were 
believed, for this was a time when scholars were 
gentlemen, and a gentleman was as a good as his 
word.”   The received paradigm began to unravel 
in the early 20th century as new interests emerged 
and inconsistencies were challenged.  By the early 
1960s, European and American scholars 
discovered the French School of les Annales. 
Les Annales was a different kind of history.  
Rather than a story-telling craft about power elites 
in the past, it solved problems evident through the 
acts and thoughts of ordinary people.  These acts 
were then shown as directly responsible for 
change across time.  The goal of Les Annales was 
an histoire totale, a total history of the human 
experience (Braudel 2001).  Its practitioners drew 
widely from documents, material culture, statistics 
and the mentalities or psychology of epochs to 
create an imbricated whole.  The two fundamental 
assumptions of Les Annales are that structures are 
historical and constantly evolving, and there are 
no fortuitous event sequences in time (Fischer 
1989).  Results are presented as argument rather 
than testimony, and the historian is required to 
demonstrate the truth-value of statements by 
rigorous methods of logic and empiricism.  The 
point is to reveal historical processes in the past 
and those of the future still in the making. 
While empiricism improves on the intuitive 
interpretations that old history presented as 
testimony it often loses the compelling 
engagement of narrative.  As such, some authors 
advocate melding the best of both – an approach 
referred to as narrative positivism (Abbott 2001).  
In practice, this is the first step of re-balancing 
specificity and context (Kolchin 2003).  As an 
investigator gets geographically and temporally 
closer to a subject they more easily recognize 
complexity and variation; as they increase the 
distance to their subject, patterns common to a 
wide variety of situations become clearer.  
Historical judgment in response to proximity and 
distance relate directly to the challenge of 
demonstrating any given past is immediate to the 
present making possible a given trajectory into the 
future.  The question is how can historical 
knowledge help resolve major problems in distinct 
disciplines including anthropology and ecology? 
 
New Ecology 
Ecology had to move from typology to 
function and from qualitative to quantitative 
description before the value of history was 
recognized.  Like historians (and other social 
scientists), ecologists after World War II sought to 
formalize their ideas about nature and develop 
theories of general validity expressed in 
mathematical form.  The concept of ecosystem 
and its single greatest advocate, Eugene Odum, 
were critical in moving ecology during this period 
from diverse and often conflictive fields of 
inquiry to the status of discipline (Golley 1993).  
The integration of ecology comes next and stems 
from the recognized need to join the two major 
schools of thought within ecology: ecosystem 
ecology and population ecology (Palladino 1991), 
colorfully referred to as stuff ecology and thing 
ecology (Pickett, Kolasa, and Jones 1994). 
Eugene Odum and his brother Howard 
favored a cybernetic view of ecosystems as self-
regulating units composed of functionally related 
parts (Odum 1953, Odum 1971).  This was a 
holistic yet deterministic perspective with roots in 
organicist and technocratic ideologies (Taylor 
1988).  The view stood in sharp contrast to the 
probabilistic and stochastic perspective of 
population ecology directed at mathematically 
examining the stability properties of real and 
model systems (Roughgarden, May, and Levin 
1989, Ulanowicz 1990).  The pioneers of this 
approach began by testing the causal link between 
species diversity and community stability that 
ecosystem ecology advocated.  In failing to verify 
its existence they shifted from the study of 
diversity-stability relationships to complexity-
stability relationships (Pimm 1991). 
The encounters between ecosystem and 
population ecology led to three fundamental 
outcomes that foster the growing recognition that 
ecology needs to integrate its two cultures 
(Holling 1998, Pickett, Kolasa, and Jones 1994).  
The first is the understanding of variability in 
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space and time and its concern with complexity, 
uncertainty and surprise (Holling 1973, Pickett 
and White 1985, Wiens 1976). The second is the 
scaling of dynamic processes and nonlinear 
interactions across hierarchies and heterarchies 
(Allen and Starr 1982, Ehrenreich, Crumley, and 
Levy 1995, Turner 1989). The third is the 
temporal dynamics of current patterns and 
processes challenging basic and deeply held 
assumptions of naturalness, balance, order and 
predictability (Carpenter and Gunderson 2001, 
Clark et al. 2001, Sprugel 1991).  These outcomes 
have engendered novel ways of thinking about 
resource management and policy often rejected by 
more conventional perspectives.  The use of 
history, including development and evolution, is 
explicitly recognized as necessary to the 
integration of ecosystem and population ecology 
(Pickett, Kolasa, and Jones 1994). 
 
Historical Ecology 
Historical ecology has many meanings 
depending on the discipline, but when it comes to 
practice, it is clear that an organismal rather than a 
molecular focus is paramount.  This focus tends to 
distance historical ecology from the practice of 
environmental history (a field it is often conflated 
with) and align it more closely with ecology.  The 
reasons are both theoretical and practical.  
Theoretically, all traditional hierarchies in ecology 
intersect at least at the level of individual 
organisms and this has been suggested as the node 
to begin the integration of ecosystem and 
population ecology from (Pickett, Kolasa, and 
Jones 1994).  Practically, history may be a rock, 
but the stories told by environmental historians 
provide little guidance in the whirlpool of 
prophecy (Cronon 1993) that decision-makers at 
all levels are asking social and ecological 
scientists for help with.  Before addressing the 
properties of time, it is relevant to consider at least 
superficially two applications of historical 
ecology outside the social sciences. 
Neo-Darwinism is a theory of how diverse 
factors in an organism’s environment operate 
uniformly on random variation to produce 
historically contingent evolutionary change.  
Evolutionary ecology tries to answer this 
historical question using indirect estimates drawn 
from phylogeny, but observations on the fossil 
record alone fail to distinguish the inseparable 
properties of evolutionary rate and historical time 
(Ehrlich and Raven 1964).  Brooks (1985) 
demonstrates by example how species can be 
considered characters of the areas where they 
occur, as well as how species’ lineages can be 
considered transformation series linking different 
areas in an historical pattern.  His argument is that 
the topology of interactions for an ecological 
association represents the direct phylogenetic 
observation complementing the fossil record. 
In population ecology, Christensen (1989) 
outlines the significance of what he terms 
landscape history for addressing the consequences 
of past events for the current structure and 
function of ecosystems.  He notes that history was 
long ignored in population ecology by virtue of 
the forcefulness of Clement’s theory of succession 
(Clements 1916, Tobey 1981).  Late successional 
ecosystems were thought to contain little 
information about their history so that disturbance 
in the past was relatively unimportant for 
explaining current ecosystem composition.  One 
of the most significant changes in the study of 
ecosystems in the last 30 years is the realization 
that environments are not static and that 
disturbances can have long-range ecological 
consequences lasting decades, centuries or even 
longer (e.g., Harding et al. 1998, Jones et al. 
1999).  The most compelling reason to study the 
effects of past disturbance on the current structure 
and function of ecosystems is the need to forecast 
future ecosystem changes and design approaches 
to managing it (e.g., Clark et al. 2001, Golodetz 
and Foster 1997, Swetnam, Allen, and Betancourt 
1999). 
The preoccupation with what happened in the 
past particularly in the second example was born 
from the contemporary interest in forecasting the 
future.  However, answering the question of why 
events happened is a necessary prequel to 
designing public policies or management 
objectives.  For example, ecologists may 
understand the effects of fire on forest ecosystems 
(e.g., Agee 1993) yet not know (or care) whether a 
fire event was started by lightning or humans 
using heavy equipment.  The why cannot be 
answered as long as humans are effectively 
excluded from the study of “natural” systems by 
reducing their role to that of an external driver or 
by equating their role to that of another organism 
(e.g., human = deer).  Bringing a human 
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dimension to historical ecology has been the focus 
of numerous social scientists in recent years.  The 
essential properties of time and how they center 
the practice of historical ecology on a problem 
and place are fundamental to their efforts. 
 
ESSENTIAL PROPERTIES OF TIME 
Time matters, but what does the concept of 
time embody?  Karl Marx in his narrative about 
Louis Napoleon’s coup d'État of December 1851 
(Marx 1937), opens with a statement referencing 
Hegel that all great world-historic facts and 
personages appear twice.  This brief statement 
embodies several essential properties about time, 
which once revealed demonstrate that only time 
that transcends chronology is truly productive to 
the historical ecology enterprise.  It is important to 
first recognize four assumptions about time as 
used in science (modified after Abbott 1992, 
Lloyd 1994, Pera 1994, Ulanowicz 1990 and 
others): 
 
Continuity Assumption: things happen in 
discrete, non-overlapping events of uniform 
duration. 
Flow Assumption: when events of different 
durations must be invoked determinacy flows 
from a) long-duration to short-duration events 
or b) context to agent. 
Sequential Assumption: the sequential order of 
change is unrelated to the nature of change 
itself. 
Homogeneity Assumption: all like-patterned 
cases result from an identical set of causal 
circumstances. 
 
The phenomena we term reality happens in 
action sequences located within constraining or 
enabling structures.  It is always a matter of 
particular actors, in particular places at particular 
times (Abbott 1992, Sayer 2000).  Marx 
understood the importance of process and wrote 
narrative explanations about social reality.  For 
example, he follows his opening statement of how 
facts and personages always appear twice with 
(1937:4): 
 
Men make their own history, but they do not 
make it as they please; they do not make it 
under self-selected circumstances, but under 
circumstances existing already, given and 
transmitted from the past. The tradition of 
all dead generations weighs like an Alp on 
the brains of the living. And just as they 
seem to be occupied with revolutionizing 
themselves and things, creating something 
that did not exist before, precisely in such 
epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously 
conjure up the spirits of the past to their 
service, borrowing from them names, battle 
slogans, and costumes in order to present 
this new scene in world history in time-
honored disguise and borrowed language. 
 
Process is a fundamental building block of 
explanation, but logical positivists in the first half 
of the 20th century succeeded in substituting 
causality for process.  Causality is a predicate of 
statements in an axiomatic structure with 
correspondence rules about the syntactic 
manipulation of variables that are mere stand-ins 
for reality rather than reality itself (Abbott 1992, 
Lloyd 1994, Sayer 2000).  It is the difference 
between syntactic and semantic scientific 
explanations, and how balancing specificity and 
context gave way to explanatory reliance on 
causal forces acting with no reference to the 
agents of change themselves (Kolchin 2003, 
Lloyd 1994, Pera 1994).  For example, “voltage” 
is partially defined by reference to readings on a 
calibrated meter such as a galvanometer even 
while the true number of observational situations 
and procedures suitable for defining voltage is 
open-ended. 
It is entirely possible to formulate a theory 
that has no empirical application, even while 
being empirically meaningful because most things 
that could happen don’t happen.  A theory is a 
semantic (meaningful) structure that serves to 
anticipate the structure and behavior that a given 
phenomenon would have if it where isomorphic to 
the theory (Lloyd 1994, Pera 1994).  However, the 
empirical meaning of a theory is separate from the 
empirical application of it.  This is important 
(although irrelevant in syntactic explanations) 
because ecology is more than complicated physics 
and chemistry, just as society is more complicated 
than the theory of Homo economicus implies.  The 
semantically interesting question is what could 
happen given physical and/or economic 
possibilities, but does not occur for ecological 
and/or social reasons? 
Process is important to answering such a 
question because events occur in interlocked and 
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interdependent sequences forming a trajectory or 
regime (Abbott 1997, Russell 1997).  Trajectories 
are characterized by their onset and duration as 
well as their inertial properties that resist change.  
They are widely recognized, although often 
vaguely defined, by both social and natural 
scientists (e.g., Agee 1993, Blench 1957, Foster, 
Knight, and Franklin 1998, Kitschelt 1992, Young 
1982).  Abbott (1997) calls trajectories the 
“master narratives” that coerce processes within 
them and prevent the subsidiary processes from 
disrupting the regime. 
However, trajectories are periodically subject 
to radical shifts or turning points that redirect the 
master narrative.  A turning point or disturbance is 
a short, consequential shift in a process that 
necessarily refers to two points in time, not just 
one (Abbott 1997, Pickett and White 1985).  It is 
only by a sudden change succeeded by a period of 
relative stability that a turning point can be 
recognized.  The potential and actual 
consequences of a turning point are at least 
partially accounted for by its frequency and 
severity.  For example, McLachlan et al. (2000) 
show that what appear as stable, old growth 
hemlock stands in New England were previously 
hardwood stands converted by agricultural forest 
clearance (i.e., the turning point or disturbance) 
that caused a shift in the trajectory of succession.  
The contemporary hemlock stands neither 
resemble pre-settlement forests nor show signs of 
returning to pre-settlement conditions. 
The coercive direction of a trajectory and the 
consequential effect of turning points on its 
stability lead to the final property of time critical 
to historical ecology: legacy.  A legacy is what 
endures from the past once change has occurred 
(Foster, Knight, and Franklin 1998).  In the study 
of place, legacies can refer to physical structures 
(i.e., sediment layers), biotic remnants (i.e., seeds) 
as well as cultural traditions (i.e., burning) that 
persist despite the redefined trajectory of a 
process resulting from a turning point.  A long-
term pattern of large, infrequent disturbance 
events constituting a “disturbance regime” exert 
an enduring influence on the landscape-level 
arrangement of vegetation and ecosystem process 
and this pattern influences the rate and pattern of 
energy flow, nutrient cycling as well as human 
and wildlife responses.  Understanding how much 
of the past is in the present is fundamental to the 
interpretation and management of ecosystems into 
the future (Peterken 1996). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Members of varied disciplines increasingly 
recognize that few spots on earth have escaped the 
imprint of humans and that many of the elements 
we prize in nature are in fact the products of past 
cultural activity (Denevan 1992, German 2003, 
Simpson et al. 2001).  How we interpret the past 
as producing the present and leading to the future 
is the real challenge.  A critical purpose served by 
historical ecology is that of a window on systems 
with sufficient temporal breadth to make it 
possible to a) determine the coercive nature of a 
given process, b) the points of transition in this 
process, and c) the legacies of the past that endure 
in the new trajectory.  By putting these three 
essential properties of time in service to historical 
ecology, anthropology is better positioned to 
understand what it means to be human.  This in 
turn will further the discipline’s contribution to 
managing Earth. 
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